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Much attention has been given to education reform at the primary and secondary level in
the United States since the “Coleman Report” (Coleman et. al., 1966). Consideration by
Becker, Murphy and Tumura, (1993) , of the role of education on economic growth, the
lagging performance of the U.S. relative to other nations at the primary and secondary
educational levels, and competition among states to attract industry with a skilled labor
force all serve to liven the public policy debate on education reform. This is true both
nationally and in South Carolina. The aim of this paper is threefold: (1) to provide the
casual reader a review of some recent findings by leading economists in the economics of
education area (2) discuss a few terms/concepts that are endemic with respect to research
in this area (3) touch on continuing research efforts at the Jim Self Center On The Future
(JSCF) that are focused on South Carolina’s educational concerns.
Section I presents the few terms and concepts that appear repeatedly in the articles that
are surveyed in Section II. Section III discusses available data assembled at the JSCF,
potential data and possible research endeavors. The last section concludes the paper.

I

Some Key Concepts

We discuss 5 terms in this section (1) Tiebout Choice (2) Selection Bias (3) Endogeneity
(4) Instruments (5) Externality
Tiebout choice refers to the process by which consumers-citizens of local public goods
choose the level and type of service for which they have a preference by locating in or
moving to the local area that provides the service closest to their liking. According to
Tiebout, (1956, p.418) “The consumer-voter may be viewed as picking that community
which best satisfies his preference pattern for public goods”. In the context of education
reform, Tiebout choice and the choice of a private school, together form traditional
choice options facing the citizen. Non-traditional choice options are charter schools,
vouchers, etc. An implication of the Tiebout hypothesis is the greater the number school
districts and the greater the variance between them, the more homogeneous they each
should become through self-selection.
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Selection Bias and endogeneity are problems endemic in this area of empirical analysis
and we motivate understanding through examples.1 In almost all studies, economists are
attempting to estimate a mathematical relationship, statistically (generally by regression
analysis) based on a sample of data. Bias refers to the estimated parameter(s) of the
equation being systematically different from the true population parameter, i.e. on
average the estimated value is different from the true value.
Hence, use of the results may lead to faulty inferences. An examination of the characteristics of charter schools to determine how school choice might affect education could be
problematic, because parents who place their children in charter schools probably are not
representative of the general population.
Specifically, they might desire a strong arts or science program, and the school curriculum would likely reflect that. One could then make the erroneous inference that if given
the choice of charter schools we would see either more arts or more science programs in
the education system.
Continuing the example of charter schools, suppose the impetus for such schools was due
to gang violence in the local public schools. Major concerns of the charter school
founders and administrators would obviously be security and discipline. The administrator might then enact strong discipline policies with a high level of security. The introduction of charter schools in general would not necessarily imply a great deal of security or
strong discipline policies. Security and discipline were endogenous to the startup of the
charter school.
The use of Instruments or Instrumental Variables (IV) is a solution strategy that might
be used to address an endogeneity problem. The researcher replaces the perceived causal
variable with a substitute that is closely related (highly correlated with) to it, but free
from the endogeneity problem. Such a variable (used in the public finance and in particular school choice analysis) is the number of rivers and streams. Such natural boundaries
were instrumental in the early development of school districts and can serve as a measure
of the degree of district concentration in a metropolitan area. Many natural boundaries
imply many districts, which imply more (Tiebout) choice. Therefore, streams might be
used as an instrument in place of the number of districts, which might be endogenous to
what is being examined. For example, districts might have been consolidated by court
order to solve a problem of education unbalance. So large consolidated metropolitan
areas would be biased toward better performance independent of choice if one were
trying to estimate the relationship between number of districts as a measure of choice and
some performance variable.
The clever development of instruments is one of the factors that led to some of the more
interesting findings over the last five years.
Externalities arise in the context of public or quasi-public goods where the actions of an
individual affect others because of the joint nature of consumption. In the context of
education, disruptive behavior by a student conveys a negative externality on others in
the class by preventing them from learning. Conversely, diversity of ideas, and incisive
questions convey a positive externality on the class. In terms of peer effects discussed
below, and tracking in particular, tradeoffs may occur with offsetting net effects.
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There are various types of selection and endogeneity problems.

2

II

A Review of Some Recent Findings

In this section we review a few new findings in the following areas: (a) Educational
Inputs, (b) School Choice, and (c) Peer Effects. Under educational inputs we look at the
issues of class size, teacher pay and quality. Under school choice we review recent
findings on charter schools, vouchers, and private school competition. We finally review
two articles on peer effects and tracking.

A.

Educational Inputs

Class Size
A testable theoretical model by Lazear (1999) shows that class size matters very little
with respect to educational output (academic performance) at equilibrium. The unique
feature of the model is that classroom education is treated as a public good and disruptive
behavior by a student is a negative externality. Disruptive behavior is the proportion of
time a student prevents additional learning by other class members (by misbehaving or
asking a question to which everyone else knows the answer). A very small average
amount of distraction (d), e.g. d= 2% with 25 students in a class leads to a large amount,
40% [1-(.98)25], of downtime. Given (d), teacher salary and other costs; class size is a
choice variable that varies inversely with (d). If administrators are optimizing the use of
school resources, then less disruptive behavior leads to larger class sizes. The optimal
class size is also affected by teacher salary. To the extent such classes have better behaved
and likely higher performing students, one might observe a positive relationship between
class size and performance. Typically, Catholic schools have larger class sizes and higher
academic performance compared to the average public school. They also have lower
expulsion rates. The above does not imply that a reduction in class size does not improve
educational output if it is applied to students at a given behavior level, i.e. holding (d)
constant. In a tracking environment (sorting by ability or discipline) reductions in class
size could be efficacious.
The implications of the model are consistent with a number of observed facts a few
reported in the article we list:
1.
2.
3.

Teacher salaries are lower for kindergarten classes where class size is smaller.
The attention span is shorter for young children, and that implies a higher level of
disruption and hence smaller class sizes.
Catholic schools are known for strict discipline, and that implies the larger class
sizes that we observe.

Discipline is a substitute for class size, and will surely lead to higher academic performance, whereas across the curriculum reductions in class size may not lead to higher
academic performance.
An ingenious empirical study by Hoxby, (2000c) of the effect of class size on achievement, finds no relationship. Endogeneity is a major problem that confronts researchers, in
that reductions in class size are correlated with other factors that affect achievement, e.g.
academic oriented parents, higher income families, etc. are more likely to push for
smaller class sizes. Hence, estimates of class size with the above endogeneity would bias
the results in the direction that class size reductions improve performance.
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Other factors could produce a bias in the other direction, e.g. analysis of programs where
the class size reductions are for special needs children or those with poor achievement.
Two identification methods based on random population variation are used to solve the
above problems. The first method removes the deterministic component of enrollment
and uses the random component (residuals) to develop an instrument that is subsequently
used in a two-stage regression, with class size in the first stage and achievement regressed on predicted class size as the second-stage. The second method exploits the
discontinuity of large changes in class size caused by district, maximum class size rules.
For example, a district might have a rule that the maximum class size is 30. A rise in
enrollment to 32 would result in two classes of size 16. The factors that caused the
enrollment to increase from 30 to 32 are minor, but the reduction in class size is large and
exogenous, i.e. independent of class size effects. This is a cleaver exploitation of natural
variation as an instrument.
The analyses, done using Connecticut data on all 649 elementary schools in 146 elementary districts, show no effect of class size on achievement. The results are also invariant
to income and race. According to Hoxby, (2000c, p. 1276) “In summary, the estimates in
Tables IV and V suggest that class size reductions are not efficacious for improving
student achievement. The estimates do not confirm the hypothesis that class size reductions are more efficacious in districts that contain low income or African-American
students.” For comparison purposes, the author performs an analysis of the data without
the corrections mentioned above. The results from this naïve approach in many specifications give a negative and statistically significant effect of class size on achievement, i.e.
reductions in class size increase standardized test scores. From earlier studies incorrect
results due to biased estimation, is the source of much controversy on the value of
expenditures on class size reductions.
We finally mention a survey article by Hanushek, (1998a). Looking at aggregate data on
pupil teacher ratios, expenditures per student, and National Assessment of Educational
Progress (NAEP) scores, the study shows a flat trend for NAEP scores, declining student/
teacher ratios, and increasing expenditures per student. One argument proffered to
explain the paradoxical result is that student populations have changed such that more
resources are needed to achieve the same results possible in the past. Causes given for the
population change are: (a) dissolution of the family due to divorce (b) increased number
of special students due to the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA) (c) increase in the
percent of children living in poverty. If the teacher population is bifurcated between the
regular and IDEA student populations, then the regular class size may not have changed.
The author shows that none of the above arguments are supported by aggregate data, and
that the belief smaller class sizes lead to greater achievement is unfounded. Between
1980 and 1990 the actual pupil teacher ratio fell by 10% from 19.1 to 17.2. Excluding the
decline caused by the increase in special education, the ratio still would have fallen from
19.1 to 17.9.
The international evidence also draws into question the belief that size matters given the
current student teacher ratio. Foreign countries generally have larger class sizes than U.S.
schools and perform much better on achievement tests. The author reviewed (to 1994)
277 econometric studies reporting estimates of student teacher ratios on performance. Of
the above studies, 28% reported statistically significant estimates, in which about half
were of the wrong sign, i.e. 13% reported a statistically significant negative sign. These
results are not unexpected given the analysis from the Hoxby article discussion above.

4

Finally, results from the experimental (STAR) project in Tennessee where some K-3
students were randomly assigned to either large class sizes (22-24) or small class sizes
(14-18) were not favorable toward smaller class sizes beyond the kindergarten level.
Hanushek (1998a, p. 27) states, “Perhaps the most standard interpretation from learning
theory begins with the view that education is a cumulative process, building on past
achievement. From this view, if students learn certain skills in the first grade, they tend to
carry over to later grades, albeit possibly with some depreciation. According to this view,
the basic evidence of the STAR study suggests that smaller classes may be important at
kindergarten but have no average effect subsequently.”

Teachers Pay and Quality
Teachers are the most important input in education production and arguments for higher
teacher salaries to increase the quantity supplied and quality of teachers have been at the
forefront of educational reform policies. It is important to consider the demand and
supply movements in the teacher market, along with quality changes and incentives faced
by both teachers and administrators. Hanushek (1998b) compares the growth in spending
to the flat student achievement trend and notes that most of the change in spending was
not due to increasing enrollment, but to per student expenditures. Between 1890 and
1980, real per student expenditures rose from $164 to $4,622 and teacher prices increased
from $34 per day in 1890 to more than $177 per day in 1990. To assess the quality and
price of teachers, their salaries are compared to the salaries of workers outside of the
teaching profession. This gives a comparative measure of where teachers lie in the
distribution of worker salaries. An increase in the percent of non-teachers earning more
than the average teacher is an indicator of a decline in teacher quality compared to
alternative occupations, despite the rise in teacher prices. It is shown that 16% of males
earned higher salaries than teachers earned in 1940 whereas 36% earned higher in 1990.
For females, 8% earned more than teachers in 1940 but 25% earned more in 1990. Pay
has risen but quality has likely declined.
Across the board spending is not likely to have an impact on performance given the
current incentive structure, as pay is not linked to student outcome. A policy implication
of the above is that a different incentive structure is needed as good and bad personnel
receive about the same compensation. “Underlying this view is a more benign opinion of
school personnel. Specifically, school personnel are not just ignoring a set of policies that
would lead to obvious improvements but instead are simply following existing incentives.” Hanushek (1998b, p.23).
Hoxby, (1996) studies the principal agency issue of teacher self-interest versus student
achievement. Two possible models are tested. The first studied is the “Rent Seeking”
model where teachers, through their unions seek more and/or a different mix of education
inputs (than parents might desire) not to maximize student achievement but to maximize
personal gain. The second model is the “Efficiency Enhancing” where teachers seek a
different mix of resources because they have superior information about the needs of
students and the education process. The study offers many interesting results. The
extensive panel data set (every school district in the U.S. over 3 census periods) and solid
econometric analysis produces results for which one might have a high level of confidence. Below we list a few of the results, but the finding with respect to the issue raised
above is given with this quote by Hoxby (1996, pp. 708-709).
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“In summary, the results indicate that teachers’ unions succeed in
raising school budgets and school inputs but have an overall
negative effect on student performance… It is striking that
unionization is associated with both more generous school inputs
and worse student achievement. This is strong evidence that teachers’
unions serve, at least in part, a rent-seeking purpose. Teachers’ unions
are, indeed, a potential answer to the puzzle of increasing spending
and stagnant student performance in the post-1960 period.”
1) During each period of analysis, spending grew faster in schools that were unionized.
Per-pupil spending increases by 12.3 percent when unionization takes place. (p. 692).
2) Spending grows faster in states that are passing unionization laws. (p. 694).
3) Unionization generated a salary increase of 5%. (p. 694).
4) Unionization decreases the student teacher ratio by about 1.7 students. (p. 695).
5) Unionization schools have a 2.3 percentage point worse dropout rate, compared to
non-unionized schools. (p. 707).
6) Unions are more effective at raising the per-pupil spending in metropolitan areas that
are more concentrated (less school districts and/or of unequal size) and with less
school choice. (p. 710).
Finally, some research has been conducted on the demand side for teachers. An interesting question addressed by Ballou (1996) is whether administrators hire the more qualified
teachers when they present themselves. If administrators are passing over the most
qualified candidates, then another policy concern is generated.
The author presents descriptive statistical measures on percent of graduates certified in
education, percent applied for teaching jobs, and percent that accepted jobs in public
education over the period 1976 to 1991. The above is also presented, stratified by the
selectivity of the admissions policies of colleges from which they graduated. This is used
as a measure of a prospective teacher’s academic background. Two observations are: a)
the higher the quality of the undergraduate institution, the less likely is the graduate to
apply for or accept a teaching job b) of those who seek teaching jobs, the higher the
quality of undergraduate institution, the less likely the applicant is offered a job. While
the supply side finding (a) was nothing new, the demand side finding (b) was new. The
author is able to rule out exceptions such as more selective graduates seek higher wages,
are more selective in terms of working conditions, and that such graduates come from the
lower end of the graduate distribution within their selective college. Results from the
econometric model developed by the author confirm what is suggested by the descriptive
measures, i.e. college quality has no significant effect on job offers.
The two-equation qualitative response model where the first equation is the application
equation (supply) and the second is the employment equation (demand), controls for
personal characteristics, academic background quality, and subject specialties. An interesting result in term of subject specialty is that a degree in education is highly beneficial
relative to a degree in the area one is preparing to teach at the secondary level. Job
prospects are better with an education degree than one in subject matter such as science
or math where a shortage seemingly exists. This statement from the author’s conclusion
summarizes the implications of the work.
“The implications of this research are unsettling. The academic ability
and cognitive skills of many of the nation’s teachers have been an
object of considerable concern. It is often alleged that improvements
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will require increases in teaching salaries vis-à-vis those available to
talented individuals in other occupations. Yet the evidence reviewed
in this paper shows that school districts do not hire the ablest
candidates available even now.” Ballou (1996, p. 130).

B.

School Choice

Whereas the findings in the previous section deliver a bleak picture in terms of educational inputs, the school choice findings discussed here are more positive. A negative
albeit non-objective review of school choice by non-economists is Good and Braden
(2000). Interest in school choice by economists probably began with Milton Friedman’s
(1962) argument for a voucher system. Despite general support for a voucher system by
many if not most economists, this idea of Friedman’s has met resistance. We review
works on the effect of school choice on curriculum, and vouchers and charter schools as
school choice vehicles.
School Characteristics Resulting From School Choice
An investigation was undertaken by Hoxby (1999) of the ex-post effects that school
choice might have on school characteristics. Opponents and proponents of school choice
disagree on the expected outcomes from choice on at least the following: 1. Whether
parents become more actively involved in changing the current school’s policy or exit to
another school after choice; opponents believe exit 2. Proponents argue average parents
desire strong academic programs whereas opponents believe they prefer easy curricula 3.
Proponents believe that the average parent desires strong disciplinary policies, while
opponents feel that the average parent places more emphasis on extracurricular activities
4. Opponents believe parents may state a desire for strong disciplinary policies but that
applies not to their own children.
The study corrects for several major problems (mentioned in the first section of this
paper) encountered in these types of studies, i.e. selection bias, endogeneity, peer effects
resulting from segregation (positive outcome of curriculum change due to sorting as
opposed to choice). The empirical strategy uses Tiebout Choice for the source of exogenous variation. The story runs, given a great degree of choice in metropolitan areas that
have many districts, compared to those with few districts, parents select the district with
the better school. This drives down property value in the bad school districts, which in
turn reduces funding for the bad schools thereby providing administrators in bad schools
the incentive to be responsive to parental desires. Thus, one should expect more responsive administrators in metro areas with a high concentration of districts where parents are
afforded the option to relocate, then in a district such as Miami, which has one school
district. An alternative estimation methodology using instrumental variables based on
natural boundaries of rivers and streams is also employed to mitigate potential
endogeneity problems. The results from both methods are compared and reported.
The findings support the proponents of choice. Some key results were:
1) More Tiebout Choice leads to more active involvement of parents in terms of
discussions with their children about curriculum, school visitations, and participation
in PTA meetings. Administrators also raise their assessment of parental involvement.
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2) A one unit increase in the choice index variable used in the analysis raises the percentage of students that take AP in the tenth and twelve grades by 35% and 20%
respectively, and increases by 20% the probability that the math curriculum offers
calculus in the twelfth grade.
3) Choice increases grade inflation (a result which supports opposition to choice), but a
one unit increase in choice leads to 1.8 more hours of homework per week.
4) In terms of discipline, school choice increases discipline, measured by severity of
disciplinary action taken against students and it leads to a more structured classroom
environment.
5) Estimates of the effect of choice on sports and extracurricular activity are insignificant, using measures of the ratio of physical education teachers to regular teachers,
number of extracurricular events, etc. A marginally significant result is that a onepercent increase in the choice index reduces by roughly 6% the percentage of students that participate in varsity sports.
Vouchers
Vouchers are entitlements granted by governments to an individual (parent) to be used at
the educational institution of choice. Two of the broadest voucher programs are in effect
in Milwaukee and Cleveland. Epple and Romano (1998) developed a theoretical and a
computational model that is calibrated to U.S. data. The computational model provides
simulated results on the effects of vouchers at various levels of public and private school
equilibria. The authors consider the effect vouchers would have on the mix of public and
private schools, accounting for family income, student ability, and peer ability.
The benchmark results (without vouchers) give 88-90% in public schools. The actual
U.S. enrollment during the period of analysis is 88%. Also, high ability students receive
tuition discounts at private schools, and extremely high ability pay negative tuition. With
a voucher of $1,800, the public school sector falls to 73% and the public school quality
index falls from 12.0 to 10.3. A greater graduation of private schools evolves with their
quality index ranging from 18.6 to 33.1. This is compared to less types of private schools
with the quality index ranging from 24.7 to 34.7 for the benchmark case. An interesting
result worth noting is that school size is inversely related to quality. Other results from
simulations using various voucher amounts up to the full minimum average cost of
educating a student ($4,200) are:
1) The distribution of ability of students shrinks as the voucher amount increases and
the size of the public school sector shrinks to zero as the voucher reaches the full cost
of education (p. 50).
2) The percentage of parents that favor the voucher increases as the voucher amount
increases but never reaches a majority, i.e. the majority do not benefit from a voucher
system though the net gain to society is positive. Specifically, a small number with
large gains from a voucher system outweigh the large number of potential participants that would experience small losses. This finding is consistent with the lack of
public political support for the voucher.
3) Welfare gains accrue until 80% of students are in the private sector, and academic
achievement gains accrue until 47% of students are in private sector schools, then
declines with additional increases in the vouchers. The tax rate to support the voucher
initially declines (reductions in public school costs outweigh the cost of voucher
schools) then rises sharply once the voucher reaches about $3,200.
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4) Increases in achievement occur as students are sorted by ability into schools with
similar peer achievement levels. Overall, complete ability stratification increases
achievement by roughly 5% over complete mixing of students. The losers from the
voucher are those who remain in the public system, which has deteriorated (with no
reduction in operating costs) as high ability students self-select into private education. Some who switch to marginal private schools also lose. The two groups just
mentioned are the largest in number. The largest achievement gains go to highability low-income individuals, and as mentioned earlier, the magnitude of gain by
the minority outweigh the small losses by the aforementioned majority.

Charter Schools
Compared to voucher systems, charter schools appear to be a more viable option for
choice proponents. The origin of the charter concept is not definitive see Hassel (1999, p.
4-5). A definition of a charter school is given by Finn, Manno and Vanourek (2000, p. 14)
as an “independent public school of choice, freed from rules but accountable for results.”
Though many states have established laws that permit charter schools, few establishment
laws have come with minimal restrictions. Arizona and Michigan have led the way for
environments that foster charter schools. According to Hassel (pp.18-21), states with
laws that foster charter schools have the following attributes:
1.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Empower groups other than local school boards to authorize charter schools
Permit wide variety of groups to establish charters
Have exemptions from many current public school regulations and policies
Have legal and fiscal independence from local school boards
Possibility for a large number of charter schools to open and be viable competitors to
public schools.

Based on the momentum of the charter movement, the proliferation of charter schools
over the last 10 years, and their successes in states where they are granted autonomy, it is
probably safe to say that charter schools are here to stay and provide competition for
traditional public schools.
If charter schools are to make a difference in terms of improved achievement, then they must do
something different. Some empirical results by Hoxby (2000a) comparing teacher characteristics
in charter, private, and public schools, are revealing. The selectivity of the college from which the
teacher graduated is a measure of quality and the study considers quantity hired and wages paid
by the three school types for various quality teachers. College rankings are based on Barron’s 1 –
9 scale college rankings, where 1 is nonselective and 9 is most selective. The regression models
that produce the selected results presented here treat for the problems discussed in the first section
of this paper. For teachers that graduated from competitive plus (8 on the scale) colleges, the
respective percentages of charter schools, private schools, and public schools from this group are
36%, 36%, and 20%. Charter schools pay this group 6.6% more than other teachers. Private and
public schools respectively pay this group 4.5% and 3.1% more. A few of the results from
Hoxby’s tables are presented in the table below. The % Wage difference is the premium paid over
teachers not in the selective group.
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Public School
%Wage

Teacher
Quantity
Percent
Math/Science Major
Majored in Subj. Area

Math/Science Courses
Taken by Teachers

Extra Instructional
Hours Worked

7.9
36.7
Average
Number
1.1

Private School
T eacher %Wage

Difference

Quantity
Percent

Difference

4.4
4.0
%Wage

6.8
41.9

9.2
7.6
%Wage

Difference

-0.05

Qty. per
Week

% Wage

8.7

-0.05

Change
per extra
hour

Average
Number
2.0
Qty. per
Week

8.7

Difference

4.0
% Wage
Change
per extra
hour

5.8

Charter School
%Wage

Teacher
Quantity
Percent

10.3
56.1
Average
Number
4.2

Difference

8.4
6.5
%Wage
Difference

3.2

Qty. per
Week

% Wage

13.4

4.9

Change
per extra
hour

Finally, credentials represented by Master’s Degrees, Certified to Teach, and Certified in Teaching Area, are uniformly higher in the traditional public school. Compensation is also uniformly greater for each compared to the charter and private school
groups. From Hoxby’s study, one might conclude that Charter and Private Schools
seek higher ability teachers and pay more at the margin for such individuals. Charter
and private schools are also more performance and less credential oriented.
Catholic Schools
We have mentioned on several occasions that Catholic school students perform better
than observationally equivalent public school students. This is true based on many studies
regardless of whether the performance measure is test scores, student earnings, or graduation rates. A study by Derek Neal (1997) finds that the performance superiority is primarily an urban phenomena that is most pronounced for minorities. His results differ greatly
from some other studies due to a more comprehensive data set developed from the
National Catholic Education Association (NCEA) school population directories and the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY).1
Also, the use of two instruments, population density of Catholics in locality and Catholic
secondary schools per square mile, address the selection bias problems.
The empirical results corrected for selection bias show no significant effect of Catholic
schools on graduation rates of students in suburban areas regardless of ethnicity. However, the probability of graduating from high school in urban areas rises from 74% to
85% for white students, and from 62% to 88% for black and Hispanic students. The
analysis is important for the public school reform debate because the interpretation of the
results is that minorities perform better in Catholic schools because the public schools
available to minorities in large urban areas are of extremely poor quality. Hence, the
observed performance increase is a direct consequence of the greater disparity in school
quality relative to urban public schools attended by white students. Specifically, there is
1

The NLSY has been used extensively by researchers in this area.
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no difference between black/white graduation rates in public schools in areas with a
population less than one million. However, for populations greater than 1 million, the
white graduation rate is 79% and the black and Hispanic rate is 69%. This 10% disparity
is taken as indicative the inferior public schools attended by minorities in large urban
areas. The author reports other results that show Catholic school students earn higher
wages later on. The results are best summarized with the author’s quote, “In sum, these
results do not indicate that Catholic schools are superior to public schools in general.
Rather, they suggest that Catholic schools are similar in quality to suburban public
schools, slightly better than urban public schools that white students usually attend, and
much better than the urban public schools that many minorities attend.”

C.

Peer Effects

Several papers reviewed above have addressed peer effects but we review two here.
Argys, Rees, and Brewer (1996) investigate the effect of tracking on peer achievement.
The authors control for class size, teacher characteristics, etc., and this is important
because there is evidence that higher tracks are assigned better teachers and more resources. As typical of the papers reviewed here, the authors control for sample selection
bias that would arise if selection is based on unobservable criteria. Tracking is a contentious policy as its use as a method of school organization increased as student diversity
increased over the last 40 years. Concern exists over the use of tracking as a means of
maintaining segregation.
The authors use the National Educational Longitudinal Study of 1988 (NELS) on 8th and
10th graders to develop a sample of about 3,400 public school students. Based on the
teacher question, results are provided on two tracks with four categories each. Track I
categories are: above average, average, below average, and heterogeneous (mixed). Track
II categories are: honors, academic, general, and vocational/other. Descriptive statistics
support the belief that upper level classes receive better inputs, e.g. higher quality teachers. Based on the track selection model of the two- stage procedure, some findings are: 1.
Initial track placement (8th. grade) has an effect on remaining in the track at 10th grade,
independent of performance on the 8th grade achievement test 2. Socioeconomic status
influences placement with better background students placed in higher tracks 3. Holding
socioeconomic status constant, race is not a good predictor of track placement.
Based on the achievement equation, some findings are: 1. Teacher experience has little
positive effect on achievement 2. Teacher certification in math leads to a 13.5% increase
in student math test scores 3. Being taught by a substitute teacher reduces math test
scores, by about 8 and 21 percentage points respectively, for both general and heterogeneous tracks. This is significant since substitute teachers are more likely assigned to
lower track classes and this exacerbates the poorer performance of this group.
The general findings on tacking are that it has a meaningful effect on student achievement, and it is symmetrical. Placing a student in the above average or average class as
opposed to the heterogeneous class increases performance by 5% and 2% respectively.
Placing a student in an honors class compared to an academic level or general level class
raises performance by 10% and 6% respectively. The effect of detracking is that students
enrolled in below level classes benefit from detracking, while those in homogeneous
upper level classes are harmed. Based on estimates, the net effect is a 1.5% decline in
math test scores as the heterogeneous mean test score is 63 and the overall mean score is
64.5. Hence, detracking is Pareto inefficient since winners cannot compensate loser.
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The author notes that on Rawlsian grounds the policy is good and may lead to less crime,
increase economic mobility, etc. in the long run as the more disadvantaged benefit at a
cost to the more advantaged.
The last article we discuss is Hoxby (2000b). This work offers one of the most meticulous treatments of selection bias in the estimation of peer effects. Peer effects include
knowledge spillovers between students with different knowledge bases, behavioral
effects possibly caused by environmental differences, e.g. disruptive behavior or
disability effects that might absorb more of a teacher’s time thereby detracting from other
students. Peer effects might be generated by negative feelings, or negative expectations
toward an ethnic group by a biased teacher. Selection bias is a problem in a comparison
between schools because of the Tiebout effect. It is a problem in a comparison between
classrooms because schools might sort by ability or behavior, or parents may seek a class
that has a particularly good teacher.
The empirical strategy exploits idiosyncratic variation in gender and racial composition
between adjacent cohorts within a grade within a school to develop instruments. Key
adjustments to account for linear trends (48,000 regressions run for these instruments) in
the data and year specific anomalies, as well as non-linearity tests, are also made. Some
key results of the study are:
1. Both female and male test scores improve by increasing the share of females in a
class, but the increases are so large, that it cannot be explained by higher average
peer achievement alone, i.e. being around a person with a 1% higher achievement
leads increases in achievement up to 7% in math. Hence, peer effects do not operate
solely through mean achievement as other studies (baseline model) have indicated.
2. Blacks, Hispanics, and whites all tend to do worse in reading and math when they are
in classes with a larger share of black students, and the effect is greatest intra-racially,
i.e. blacks have a more negative effect on other black students. Since blacks have the
lowest scores on average, the above result is mostly a mean peer achievement effect.
3. For every 10% point change in the share of their class that is Asian, white 5th and 6th
graders score 0.07 and .20 points higher respectively in math. This also is in line with
mean peer achievement effects as Asian students have higher average math scores.
4. The analysis of idiosyncratic variation based on changes in residuals between cohorts
(empirical strategy 2) shows that achievement in math and reading is positively
correlated by gender and race. The racial origin of peer achievement is unimportant.
Specifically, if due to random variation, a class experiences an influx of higher
achieving students, then that affects the class positively in terms of achievement
regardless of origin of ethnicity, i.e. higher achieving blacks have a positive effect on
lower achieving whites, higher achieving Native Americans have a positive effect on
lower achieving Hispanics, etc. The results of the analysis are cycled through all four
ethnic groups (Hispanic, white, black, Native American) in the tables provided by
Hoxby.
An implication of 4 is that improving educational production across the board has
positive cross effects by gender and race.
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III

JSCF Research Prospects

Most of the studies in this review article used national data sets for their analysis, but the
findings are generally applicable. Work by Lanier and Salzman (1999) is in line with the
studies reviewed here, and their findings on South Carolina school districts are consistent
with many of the results reported. It might be useful to employ some of the empirical
strategies presented in the above studies on South Carolina data. Also while most of the
studies analyze data at the school district level, interesting results might be forthcoming
from analysis at the school level. Descriptive statistics on school level data raise a
number of flags such as: 1. great variance in performance among schools in the same
district 2. seeming geographic anomaly of lower performance by schools along the I-95
corridor in South Carolina 3. systematic lower performance by schools with a high
percentage of black students.
It might be useful to develop a rank order assessment of every school in the state and
associate and track administrative/school performance and regime changes. Such additional panel data information would enhance further research. Such information would be
useful for parental decision-making with respect to school choice. Such a rank ordering
might raise accountability. Ideal would be a system that would allow researchers to track
cohorts through their academic career or individual students through nondescript identification.
From the studies reviewed above, a number of questions arise. A few are:
1. How important is Tiebout Choice in South Carolina, and what effect has it had on
thecomposition of schools and districts?
2. What effect if any are charter schools having on educational achievement in South
Carolina and traditional public education?
3. What effect has traditional choice had on inter and intra district school composition
and performance?
4. What is the impact of Catholic schools on public education in the large urban areas of
South Carolina?
5. How significant is tracking and what are its effects at the district and school level in
South Carolina?
6. To what extent does disruptive behavior pose a problem and what effect does it have
on academic achievement, class size, and school organization, i.e. tracking?

A number of states, e.g. The Star Program in Tennessee, The Texas School Project, have
developed experimental programs to evaluate reform policies that might be efficacious. A
number of researchers at Clemson are independently working in the area of the economics of education and education reform. A joint interdisciplinary experimental project with
state educators, academics, and interested stakeholders might be a fruitful venture.
Finally, we have not reviewed the literature on school finance and in particular recent
findings on school finance equalization. However, with the implementation of the South
Carolina Lottery for educational funding and budget cuts due to a revenue shortfall from
traditional sources, recent findings on school finance and findings reported in this review
on the effectiveness of certain types of spending on achievement, should be given careful
attention.
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Conclusion
The articles reviewed present some new findings on educational production and school
choice. New results are forthcoming because of the researchers’ careful control for
statistical biases that have plagued earlier studies and innovative econometric empirical
strategies. It is shown that peer effects have a significant effect on achievement and such
effects can be negative or positive. On the positive side, higher idiosyncratic performance
increases peer performance and this is true regardless of ethnicity, i.e. higher achievement
by individuals of any ethnic group in a cohort leads to higher achievement by others in
any ethnic group. On the negative side, lower average achievement by a group leads to
lower achievement of peers. Therefore detracking reduces performance and harms higher
level tracks but increases performance and benefits lower tracks. The above is all based
on performance as measured by test scores which we believe is a valid and the best
objective measure of educational achievement. However, interpersonal skills and social
awareness acquired by mixing are also valuable skills that are important in the labor
market and such effects are not the focus of the articles reviewed.
Disruptive behavior might be the key factor for the poor academic achievement in the
U.S. The article by Lazear shows that a little disruptive behavior leads to a large amount
of learning downtime. Casual observation leads one to conclude that many urban schools
have lost control of discipline particularly since the 1960’s. Disciplinary policies changed
over the last 40 years due to law changes and disciplinary methods and ideas purveyed by
some sociologists and psychologists. Issues of attracting and retaining good teachers,
teachers pay, and teacher performance (which is criticized to a great degree above) are all
related to child discipline. Solving the discipline problem should have a positive effect
teaching. Any serious educational reform policies need to address the issue of disruptive
behavior and discipline prior to pouring additional funds at a lost cause (at least from an
efficiency point of view) in many urban schools.
All of the articles reviewed here show that increased school choice should be beneficial.
Catholic schools have a comparative advantage in urban areas particularly with respect to
minorities because urban schools are so much worse for such groups compared to suburban schools. Catholic schools maintain strict discipline with lower expulsion rates and
something might be learned from their model. Both vouchers and charter schools should
have a positive effect on academic achievement both directly and through competition
that would motivate a change in behavior of traditional public schools that are lackluster.
However, given the general sentiment to the voucher system, charter schools are more
likely the vehicle for introducing more school choice.
Finally, it might be useful to develop to develop interdisciplinary experimental projects in
an effort to enhance educational production in South Carolina. This is so because of the
number of independent researchers at Clemson, JSCF, S.C. Dept. of Education, etc. who
are working in this area.
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